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Abstract 
 
This paper reports on generic issues discovered as a result of conducting computer and network vulnerability 
assessments (CNVA) on Australian critical infrastructure providers. Generic issues discovered included policy, 
governance, IT specific such as segregation, patching and updating. Physical security was also lacking in some cases. 
Another issue was that previous security audits had failed to identify any of these issues. Of major concern is that 
despite education and awareness programs, and a body of knowledge referring to these issues, they are still 
occurring. It may be necessary for the federal government to force organisations to undergo computer and network 
vulnerability assessment from recognised experts on a regular basis. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
Traditionally SCADA systems were designed around reliability and safety, and if they were network connected 
they were connected on isolated internal networks for the purposes of control and management; essentially a 
closed system. Typically in these situations security was not a consideration due to the isolated nature of the 
systems and their closed nature. It should be remembered that these systems were implemented also in an era 
when computing and information technology will also largely conducted in isolated installations or laboratories 
around the globe (Stouffer et al, 2007). The world has now moved on and we are becoming increasingly 
interconnected and interdependent on these connections for the full functioning of modern society. One of the 
main conduits and enablers for this has been the rapid expansion of the Internet. Correspondingly, as a result of 
the growth of the Internet there has been a convergence on the TCP/IP protocol suite as the dominant network 
protocol for business and industry. This has seen many hardware and software vendors, including SCADA 
vendors, align their products with this kind of reality (Igure et al, 2006). This transition to a level of greater 
interconnectedness has impacted on the security posture of these systems. Threats and vectors that did not exist 
prior to this transition are now becoming realisable threats. There is an increasing reliance on public 
telecommunications networks to link previously separate SCADA systems making them more accessible to 
attacks. Then be increasing use of published open standards and protocols, in particular Internet technologies, 
expose SCADA systems to Internet or network borne attacks, that were not realisable for instance on proprietary 
protocols that were used previously to control such systems. The actual increased interconnection of SCADA 
systems to corporate networks is a significant threat in itself enabling and making them accessible to undesirable 
entities e.g. malfeasant insiders (Jackson-Higgins, 2007). Many systems that are in SCADA networks often lack 
mechanisms to provide confidentiality of communications for example the use of sufficiently strong encryption 
to protect data during transit. This type ofproblem coupled with a lack of appropriately strong or granular 
authentication mechanisms and controls in many SCADA systems and the problem becomes manifold even to a 
security novice. This paper reports on and discusses some generic issues discovered as a result of conducing 
computer and network vulnerability assessments on Australian critical infrastructure providers. 
 
THE CNVA PROGRAM AND WHY WE NEED IT FOR SCADA 
 
The Computer Network Vulnerability Assessment (CNVA) program is an Australian Government grants 
scheme developed to help ensure the security of Australia’s critical infrastructure (TISN 2008). The program is 
managed by GovCERT.au – the Australian Government computer emergency readiness team, which is under 
the umbrella of the Australian Government Attorney-General’s Department. The program provides funding of 
up to 50 per cent of the cost of a vulnerability assessment to private critical infrastructure owners and/or 
operators, including Government Business Enterprises. 
 
Although not many public stories, there are reports of attacks against critical infrastructure. Sources of attack 
include vectors both intentional and unintentional. Categories covered by the former include hacking, insider 
malfeasance, and malware. Unintentional vectors include malware and lack of due diligence. The most infamous 
of the intentional attacks is the case of Maroochy shire. Their SCADA system was hacked by a person who had 
been employed to install the system after a request for employment was turned down (Smith, 2001). An example 
of unintentional malware interfering with SCADA systems is the SQL Slammer worm released in 2003. This 
worm infected the Davis-Besse nuclear power plant in Ohio, USA, causing operators to lose a degree of control 
over the system. As a result, the plant safety display system and process control computers were shut down for 
nearly seven hours (Poulsen, 2003). A more recent incident and an example of lack of due diligence, 
orintentional consequences of a legitimate activity, was the shutdown of a nuclear power plant. The update of 
software on a computer on the plants business network caused reset of data on the control system. The safety 
systems interpreted this lack of data to mean that there was no water in the reservoirs that cool the rods, and shut 
down the reactor (Krebs, 2008). There has also been public commentary by a CIA analyst that utilities based in 
foreign countries had been attacked through the internet (Nakashima & Mufson, 2008). It was further reported 
that these attacks had resulted in power outages in a major city. The same article also indicated that there had 
been an increase in internet based attacks against utilities in the United States. 
 
SPECIFIC ISSUES INDETIFIED THROUGH THE CNVA PROGRAM 
 
This section discusses the issues that have been discovered as a result of the author’s participation in the CNVA 
program. There were a range of specific issues discovered, with the generic, common issues highlighted in this paper. 
There are no specific cases discussed here as this would be in violation of various confidentiality agreements. 
 
Connection of SCADA to corporate 
 
This point is not really a surprise, as it is why the CNVA exists. However, despite available advice and 
documentation (Stoufer et al, 2007), and in some cases even in complete contradiction of corporate policy, 
corporate and SCADA networks are being connected with little, if any, segregation. As mentioned previously, 
SCADA has a soft underbelly as it was designed to work, with security coming second to functionality. 
However, when SCADA systems were initially designed, the internet didn’t exist, and what elements may have 
existed was not a threat to systems installed at that time. The issue here is that despite evidence that connection 
of SCADA to corporate networks without appropriate barriers is an identified risk, and should not happen, it is 
still occurring. 
 
Governance 
 
All cases had significant issues with effective governance of the critical infrastructure assets. In this case we 
mean the assets to be both the corporate and SCADA networks of the organisations the authors examined. All 
organisations demonstrated poor delineation of corporate ownership and responsibility for the SCADA networks 
and in some cases the supporting information technology infrastructures. Several sessions during the 
assessments sometimes degenerated into a scene from Martin Scorsese film i.e. “are you talkin to me, are you 
talking to me?” with the general abrogation of responsibility ensuing shortly there afterwards. Sadly one of the 
common memes was “Engineers don’t know much about security with the counter meme “IT nerds know less 
about SCADA” often being the first point both parties agreed on. Some fundamental governance questions had 
not been addressed by any of the organisations.  
These were:  
• Who was responsible for change management for each of the assets? 
• Who is in charge of the IT network, and are they still in charge after it is connected to SCADA? 
• What is the escalation process should there be a record of incident? 
 
In some cases, there were even issues relating to the ownership and availability of documentation for corporate 
networks and computer hardware and software. 
 
Policy 
 
As a result of poor governance structures within the organisations the policy structures also suffered. There was 
little evidence of any policy review, policy enforcement, policy auditing or existence of any 
policyimplementation. Review of the policy documentation that was presented during the assessments revealed 
it was rarely current and was lacking in relevant details. The policy in some instances had not been reviewed or 
revised for several years. In some cases where there was the existence of a policy there existed approved 
procedures which were in direct contravention to the existing policy. These procedures are also often created, 
produced and implemented by third parties such as contractors. In one case the outsourced contract is for the 
network infrastructure eventually refused to produce policy documents. The basis for this was that they were not 
required under the terms of the contract to surrender such documents. 
 
IT SPECIFIC ISSUES 
 
Un-Patched Hardware And Software 
 
All of the assessments conducted found exploitable vulnerability as a result of un-patched hardware and 
software issues. Of particular concern were perimeter firewalls that had multiple exploitable vulnerability as a 
result of dilettante patching regimes. These firewall exploits were well known and had been known in the 
security community for up to four to five years. 
 
Due to legacy nature of SCADA systems all of the underlying supporting computer operating systems had 
significant vulnerability. Most of the operating systems examined in all assessments had long since become no 
longer supported by the vendor. Most of the supporting applications in the form of SQL servers, network 
operating systems or specific SCADA applications were likewise no longer supported by the vendor. 
 
Lack Of Network Segregation And Segmentation 
 
Assessments conducted so far have revealed networks that are severely compromised under the defence in-depth 
strategy. Several of the network architectures were based on flat 10.0.0.0/8 networks allowing for a reversal of 
the entire network including corporate and control systems. Penetration of perimeter controls would have 
allowed complete sight into the enterprises examined. This would allow the easy implantation of malcode such 
as packet sniffers or keystroke analysers into the network architectures. In one instance the organisation was 
unsure as to where the connections to a fibre ring they connected to which was used by other organisations 
actually terminated. Furthermore they were initially unsure and as to what controls and countermeasures were in 
place to prevent ingress into the network from this network. 
 
Lack Of Sound Authentication Mechanisms 
 
Several of the installations provided generic logins to staff members for example username equals staff 
password equals staff. All of the systems reviewed had no reliable or monitored audit trial for systems access. 
That is no coordinated logging of even simple statistics such as logon or log off was conducted. These logins 
were provided mainly for expediency and were handed out typically as a result of the work environment trusting 
individuals. Given that 60 to 80% of losses sustained by successful I T. enabled crime or malfeasance is 
committed by insiders (Richardson, 2008), one could postulate this is an extremely unwise move on the part of 
management. Furthermore, some of the generic accounts uncovered in the examinations had root or admin level 
access to the entire IT infrastructure. This would allow any malicious individual the power to corrupt absolutely. 
 
The use of such simple and group based passwords also allows a substantial vector for the disgruntled employee 
to penetrate the system and wreak havoc with impunity. 
 
Monitoring, logging, auditing 
 
There was a complete lack of any substantive logging of network interactions with attendant monitoring and 
then subsequent auditing and review. This observation put all organisations in an invidious position with respect 
to the network based exploit and attack. This leads to the realisation that most of the organisations had no ability 
to answer fundamental questions such as have we been attacked? We got hacked – how did it happen? Inability 
to answer even these basic questions makes amelioration or reduction of any network borne threat a relatively 
impossible task. 
 
In one organisation there was a logging of firewall connections but no actual review of these logs to determine 
any emergent threat, unauthorised connections or internal malfeasant activity. The net value of this type of 
logging is a completely negative proposition for the organisation. The organisation is wasting money 
loggingdata that was never intended to be examined. 
 
 
It has been proven already due to the nature of SCADA systems that the use of intrusion detection systems and 
intrusion prevention systems can shutdown communications, which can have potentially catastrophic 
unintended consequences (Fink et al, 2006). If we cannot reliably implement and use intrusion detection 
systems or intrusion prevention systems to protect networks that run SCADA devices, the use of monitoring 
logging and auditing are fundamental tools and techniques in providing response against network based attack. 
In some cases the use of these is the first and last line of defence against attacks that would be perpetrated 
against networks. 
 
Physical Security 
 
Although not part of a computer system or hardware, physical security is still an important part of computer 
security, and also part of any properly conducted computer and network vulnerability assessment. For example, 
are server rooms protected by appropriate fire suppression systems? Are physical access control methods 
inplace for servers and other equipment? 
 
There were a number of issues relating to physical controls which are of concern, as physical systems can be 
barriers to casual attacks. One organisation had no restriction on access into the main control room for the 
SCADA network. Another had servers and other communications equipment stored in a physically vulnerable 
location. Yet another had no fire suppression system for their SCADA master servers. A remote site visited as 
part of an assessment had no alarms on doors, unaccounted for keys, rooms that stayed open and unlocked that 
also had computer terminals. Locked doors were often the only barriers in some cases. 
 
Previous reports and audits 
 
At some of the organisations that were assessed, there were reports on the security that had been conducted by 
previous groups. It was unclear as to whether these had been conducted as part of the CNVA program, or if they 
had been commissioned by these organisations in a commendable attempt to increase their security posture. 
Unfortunately, the reports had missed most of the critical issues identified by the authors in these cases. That is 
not to say that the authors did not also miss some problems; nobody is perfect. The issue is that these were 
reports prepared by large organisations who specialise in IT security auditing. It would be of concern if these 
organisations were part of the CNVA panel, and had been conducting audits on this basis. Given that GovCERT 
has oversight on the reports produced by CNVA audits, it seems more likely they were not produced as part of 
the CNVA program. The issue, however, is that security audits are being performed by organisations that do not 
appear to have the necessary knowledge of specific SCADA IT security issues that must be addressed if security 
is to be improved. 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
The vulnerability assessments conducted by the authors have left little doubt that there is certainly a need for the 
CNVA program. It is understandable that safety and risk engineers and managers in the critical infrastructure 
sector are largely concerned with physical as they either don’t understand the nature or the risk from the 
information technology perspective. The authors have seen on more than one occasion the attitude that “It won’t 
happen to us”, or “I have far more to worry about with a faulty valve exploding”. There was little perceived risk 
from the IT vector. However, the reality is that cyber attacks against CIPs are happening around the world, as 
pointed out earlier in this article. The other upcoming issue is that these CIPs are looking to implement TCP/IP 
based communication protocols in place of largely unknown legacy protocols such as Modbus and DNP3. This 
will only introduce further vulnerability, as use of such protocols currently at least provides some sort ofsecurity 
through obscurity. 
 
Despite the existence in Australia of SCADA communities of interest, despite numerous publications aimed at 
both management and technical audiences (TISN 2005), and even in spite of the CNVA program, there still 
appears to be serious issues with recognition of the security issues faced by connecting SCADA networks to the 
internet. Of concern is that most of the issues reported in this paper are not new, and have been discussed 
previously in other reports concerning SCADA security (Stamp et al, 2003; Fink et al, 2006; Igure et al, 2006; 
Stouffer et al, 2007). The authors would argue that not only does the CNVA program need to be continued, but 
that it needs to be expanded. Associated work by the authors has also revealed that hard drives and other 
computer hardware are being disposed of without being properly erased from CIPs. This adds further weight for 
a call for all critical infrastructure providers to undergo some form of external computer and network 
vulnerability assessment or audit on a regular basis. 
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